Despite their best efforts, many countries will continue to be vulnerable to deliberate introductions of different plant and animal diseases by terrorist groups with an ideological agenda or by governments, corporations, or individuals with a profit motive. The vulnerability to agricultural bio-terrorist attack is a consequence of the mostly low security of agricultural targets, the technical ease of introducing consequential diseases, and the large economic repercussions of even small outbreaks. It is enraged by structural features of global agriculture that are unlikely to change without forceful government intervention: low genetic diversity of plants and animals, extensive mono-culture, and highly concentrated animal agriculture.

While the vulnerability cannot be eliminated, effective response can minimize the damage from both intentionally and naturally introduced disease. There have been suggested an aggressive scientific agenda: continuing education programs for farmers, veterinarians, and extension specialists; development of new diagnostics, vaccines, and pesticides; development of new sensing technologies for early identification of plant disease outbreaks; development of plant varieties resistant to diseases not yet endemic; and an increase in the number of outbreak control specialists assigned to international disease control efforts. This is an expensive agenda, but cost-effective in context—a single serious outbreak prevented or quickly controlled could pay for the program several times over. Given the ever-increasing international traffic in agricultural commodities combined with decreasing transit times, we can expect continued natural introductions of exotic plant and animal diseases. These will easily justify the cost of the programs that is recommended. Clearly, aggressive action is warranted to address the deficiencies of this global current response system, for both naturally and deliberately introduced plant and animal diseases, given the billions of dollars at stake.