The 15th BRICS Summit, held in South Africa from the 22nd to the 24th of August was predictably underwhelming in its lack of concrete outcomes. The BRICS, even after the addition of six new members next year, will be anything but an alternative or rival to the G7. For all the talk about multipolarity, the BRICS, and their expansion, contribute further to the consolidation of a new bipolar order with just two rival blocs—led respectively by the US and China. It remains to be seen, however, whether dislike of a US-dominated order is enough to sustain the current lure of the BRICS. What it’s about: The 94-paragraph Johannesburg II Declaration issued at the summit of currently five members of the BRICS—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—is a mostly aspirational and self-congratulatory document. The only truly notable outcome of the summit is contained in paragraph 91:We have decided to invite the Argentine Republic, the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to become full members of BRICS from 1 January 2024.This is preceded by the announcement that “BRICS countries reached consensus on the guiding principles, standards, criteria and procedures of the BRICS expansion process” but without any further elaboration of what these might be. And the announcement of expansion is followed by a commitment “to further develop the BRICS partner country model and a list of prospective partner countries”.Apart from that, the Declaration is hardly a revolutionary document. It repeats calls for reform rather than replacement of key international institutions, such as the UN, the World Trade Organisation, and the IMF. In addition, the BRICS “reaffirm the importance of the G20 to continue playing the role of the premier multilateral forum in the field of international economic and financial cooperation”.There are the usual expressions of concern about war and conflict, with Sudan, Niger, Libya, Western Sahara, Yemen, Syria, the Occupied Palestinian Territories, and Haiti all name-checked. On Ukraine, the language is predictably vague to accommodate the different stakes that the five members have:We recall our national positions concerning the conflict in and around Ukraine as expressed at the appropriate fora, including the UNSC and UNGA. We note with appreciation relevant proposals of mediation and good offices aimed at peaceful resolution of the conflict through dialogue and diplomacy, including the African Leaders Peace Mission and the proposed path for peace.On the other big issue in the run-up to the summit—de-dollarisation and the possible establishment of a BRICS currency—the Declaration stretches as far as “stress[ing] the importance of encouraging the use of local currencies in international trade and financial transactions between BRICS as well as their trading partners” and “encourag[ing] strengthening of correspondent banking networks between the BRICS countries and enabling settlements in the local currencies” with BRICS finance ministers and central bank governors to report back on these issues at the next summit.Why it matters: In their current five-member composition, the BRICS constitute just over 40% of the world’s population and account for one-quarter of global GDP ($26tn out of $104tn, according to World Bank data). The six new members will not significantly increase either of these figures: based on 2022 data, the enlarged BRICS’ share of global GDP will only increase by three percentage points. But with the addition of major Chinese oil and gas suppliers—notably Saudi Arabia and the UAE, less so, for now, Iran—what will, from 2024 onwards count as BRICS-internal trade is likely to increase. The same is probable to occur for BRICS-to-BRICS FDI. All five current members are part of the G20. With Argentina and Saudi Arabia joining the BRICS in 2024, seven G20 members will also be BRICS countries. If current, and future, members of the BRICS are serious about the G20 as “the premier multilateral forum in the field of international economic and financial cooperation” and if they are able to align and coordinate their approaches to global political and economic issues, dynamics at the G20 may change under the Brazilian presidency in 2024. But this is a very big ‘if’.Our take: The BRICS do not constitute an alternative world order in either a geopolitical or geoeconomic sense. The BRICS are not an international organisation in the traditional sense with a legal personality and a permanent secretariat, often established by a formal treaty, and united by a common purpose. Their ‘creation’ was almost accidental, based on an assessment in 2001 that GDP growth in the emerging markets of Brazil, Russia, India, and China would accelerate significantly and consequently have an impact on the global economic and financial system. Their ...
